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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
 
Nos.: 97-5609 and 98-5125 
 
In Re: Baby Food Antitrust Litigation 
 
JACOB BLINDER & SONS, INC., WISEWAY SUPER FOOD 
CENTER, INC., SUPER CENTER, INC., UNITED 
BROTHERS FINER FOODS, INC., L. L. HARRIS 
WHOLESALE GROCERY, PETER J. SCHMITT & CO., 3932 
CHURCH STREET SUPERMARKET, INC., ARLEEN FOOD 
PRODUCTS CO., INC., RUBIN BROOKS AND SONS, INC., 
       Appellants 
 
(D.C. Civil No. 92-cv-05495) 
 
JACOB BLINDER & SONS, INC., on behalf of itself and all 




GERBER PRODUCTS COMPANY; H.J. HEINZ COMPANY; 
RALSTON PURINA COMPANY; BNNC CORPORATION, (now 
dissolved) fka BEECH-NUT-NUTRITION fka BEECH-NUT 
FOODS CORPORATION (now dissolved) fka 
BAKER/BEECH-NUT CORPORATION (now dissolved) BCN 
CORPORATION, (now dissolved) fka BEECH-NUT 
CORPORATION; NESTLE HOLDINGS, INC.; 
 
(Newark New Jersey Civil No. 92-cv-05495) 
 




GERBER PRODUCTS COMPANY; H.J. HEINZ COMPANY; 
RALSTON PURINA COMPANY; BNNC CORPORATION, (now 
dissolved) aka BEECH-NUT-NUTRITION aka BEECH-NUT 
FOODS CORPORATION (now dissolved) aka 
BAKER/BEECH-NUT CORPORATION (now dissolved) BCN 
CORPORATION, (now dissolved) aka BEECH-NUT 




(Newark New Jersey Civil No. 93-cv-00047) 
 
WISEWAY SUPER FOOD CENTER, INC., on behalf of itself 




GERBER PRODUCTS COMPANY; H.J. HEINZ COMPANY; 
RALSTON PURINA COMPANY; BNNC CORPORATION, (now 
dissolved) aka BEECH-NUT-NUTRITION aka BEECH-NUT 
FOODS CORPORATION (now dissolved) aka 
BAKER/BEECH-NUT CORPORATION (now dissolved) BCN 
CORPORATION, (now dissolved) aka BEECH-NUT 
CORPORATION; NESTLE HOLDINGS, INC.; 
 
(Newark New Jersey Civil No. 93-cv-00048) 
 





GERBER PRODUCTS COMPANY; H.J. HEINZ COMPANY; 
RALSTON PURINA COMPANY; BNNC CORPORATION, (now 
dissolved) aka BEECH-NUT-NUTRITION aka BEECH-NUT 
FOODS CORPORATION (now dissolved) aka 
BAKER/BEECH-NUT CORPORATION (now dissolved) BCN 
CORPORATION, (now dissolved) aka BEECH-NUT 
CORPORATION; NESTLE HOLDINGS, INC.; 
 
(Newark New Jersey Civil No. 93-cv-00049) 
 
UNITED BROTHERS FINER FOODS, INC., on behalf of 




GERBER PRODUCTS COMPANY; H.J. HEINZ COMPANY; 
RALSTON PURINA COMPANY; BNNC CORPORATION, (now 
dissolved) aka BEECH-NUT-NUTRITION aka BEECH-NUT 
FOODS CORPORATION (now dissolved) aka 
BAKER/BEECH-NUT CORPORATION (now dissolved) BCN 
CORPORATION, (now dissolved) aka BEECH-NUT 
CORPORATION; NESTLE HOLDINGS, INC.; 
 
(Newark New Jersey Civil No. 93-cv-00050) 
 
L. L. HARRIS WHOLESALE GROCERY, a partnership, on 
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GERBER PRODUCTS COMPANY; H.J. HEINZ COMPANY; 
RALSTON PURINA COMPANY; BNNC CORPORATION, (now 
dissolved) aka BEECH-NUT-NUTRITION CORPORATION 
(now dissolved) aka BEECH-NUT FOODS CORPORATION 
(now dissolved) aka BAKER/BEECH-NUT CORPORATION 
(now dissolved) BNC CORPORATION, aka BEECH-NUT 
CORPORATION; (now dissolved); NESTLE 
HOLDINGS, INC.; 
 
(Newark New Jersey Civil No. 93-cv-00051) 
 
3932 CHURCH STREET SUPERMARKET, INC., an Illinois 




GERBER PRODUCTS COMPANY; H.J. HEINZ COMPANY; 
RALSTON PURINA COMPANY; BNNC CORPORATION, 
(formerly known successively as Baker/Beech-Nut 
Corporation, Beech Nut Foods Corporation, and Beech 
Nut Nutrition Corporation) (now dissolved); BNC 
CORPORATION, (formerly known as Beech-Nut 
Corporation) (now dissolved); NESTLE HOLDINGS, INC.; 
 
(Newark New Jersey Civil No. 93-cv-0320) 
 
ARLEEN FOOD PRODUCTS CO., INC., on behalf of itself 




GERBER PRODUCTS COMPANY; H.J. HEINZ COMPANY; 
RALSTON PURINA COMPANY; BNNC CORPORATION, 
(formerly known successively as Baker/Beech-Nut 
Corporation, Beech-Nut Foods Corporation, and Beech- 
Nut Nutrition Corporation) (now dissolved) BNC 
CORPORATION, (formerly known as Beech-Nut 
Corporation) (now dissolved); NESTLE HOLDINGS, INC.; 
 
(Newark New Jersey Civil No. 93-cv-0407) 
 
RUBIN BROOKS AND SONS, INC., on behalf of himself 
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GERBER PRODUCTS COMPANY; H.J. HEINZ COMPANY; 
RALSTON PURINA COMPANY; BNNC CORPORATION, 
(formerly known successively as Baker/Beech-Nut 
Corporation, Beech-Nut Foods Corporation and Beech-Nut 
Nutrition Corporation) (now dissolved); BNC 
CORPORATION, (formerly known as Beech-Nut 
Corporation (now dissolved); NESTLE HOLDINGS, INC. 
 
(Newark New Jersey Civil No. 93-cv-00802) 
 
Jacob Blinder & Sons, Inc., Wiseway Super Food Center, 
Inc., Super Center, Inc., United Brothers Finer Foods, 
Inc., L. L. Harris Wholesale Grocery, Peter J. Schmitt & 
Co., 3932 Church Street Supermarket, Inc., Arleen Food 
Products Co., Inc., Rubin Brooks and Sons, Inc., 
       Appellants in No. 98-5125 
 
Appeal for the United States District Court 
For the District of New Jersey 
D.C. Nos.: 92-cv-05495, 93-cv-00047, 93-cv-00048, 
93-cv-00049, 93-cv-00050, 93-cv-00051, 
93-cv-00320, 93-cv-00407 
District Judge: Honorable Nicholas H. Politan 
 
Argued: October 1, 1998 
 
Before: BECKER, Chief Judge, ROSENN, Circuit Judge and 
KATZ, District Judge* 
 
(Filed January 12, 1999) 
 
*The Honorable Marvin Katz, District Judge, Eastern District of 
Pennsylvania, sitting by designation. 
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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
ROSENN, Circuit Judge. 
 
This appeal, relating to a highly concentrated nationwide 
industry, raises interesting questions of proof and law in a 
hotly-contested antitrust action. The plaintiffs, direct 
purchasers of baby food from defendant manufacturers, 
include wholesalers, supermarket chains, and other direct 
purchasers. The defendants, nationally prominent 
corporations, are Gerber Products Company ("Gerber"), H.J. 
Heinz Co. ("Heinz"), Nestle Food Company/Beech-Nut 
("Nestle/Beech-Nut") and Ralston Purina Company/Beech- 
Nut ("Ralston/Beech-Nut") (collectively "Beech-Nut").1 
Collectively, they account for over 98% of all baby food 
products manufactured and sold in the United States. 
 
The plaintiffs are Jacob Blinder & Sons, Inc., Wiseway 
Super Food Center, Inc., Super Center, Inc., United 
Brothers Finer Foods, Inc., L.L. Harris Wholesale Grocery, 
Peter J. Schmitt & Co., 3932 Church Street Supermarket, 
Inc., Arleen Food Products Co., Inc., and Rubin Brooks and 
Sons, Inc. They brought this anti-trust class action against 
the defendant manufacturers under SS 4 and 6 of the 
Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. SS 15 and 26, in the United States 
District Court for the District of New Jersey. They allege 
that beginning in early 1975 and continuing until 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. Before 1989, Beech-Nut was owned by Nestle Food Co. In November 
1989, Ralston Purina purchased Beech-Nut from Nestle. Therefore, the 
four defendants are actually Heinz, Gerber, Nestle/Beech-Nut, and 
Ralston/Beech-Nut. 
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December 31, 1993,2 the defendants engaged in an 
unlawful conspiracy in violation of Section 1 of the 
Sherman Act (15 U.S.C. S 1) to fix, raise, and maintain 
wholesale prices and price levels of baby food in the United 
States resulting in injury and damage to the plaintiffs. 
 
At the conclusion of discovery, each defendant filed a 
motion for summary judgment. The District Court granted 
the motion in favor of all defendants. The clerk taxed costs 
in favor of the defendants and that court affirmed the 
award of costs. 
 
Defendants timely appealed from both orders to this 






Gerber, although the smallest of the defendant 
corporations, is the nation's largest manufacturer of baby 
food products and accounts for approximately 70% of the 
total market in the United States. Heinz and Beech-Nut 
share almost equally the balance of the market. Gerber 
manufactures and sells approximately 200 different baby 
food products; Heinz follows closely with 165 and Beech- 
Nut with approximately 140. Collectively, they sell slightly 
more than 500 baby food products grouped into five broad 
categories: First Food, Second Foods, Third Foods, Cereals, 
and Juices. Together, they provide much of the nutrition for 
most of the nation's infant population. 
 
Through the pricing of their products, each defendant 
has sought to differentiate itself and carve out a company 
niche in the marketplace. Gerber is the undisputed market 
leader and premium brand, selling its products nationwide 
and focusing only on baby food. Heinz is the "value" brand, 
consistently adopting strategies to maintain a significant 
price spread between itself and Gerber. Heinz has had a 
strong presence in the central Midwestern and 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
2. The District Court certified the action as a class for the period 
beginning January 1, 1989, and ending December 31, 1992. 
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Southwestern parts of the country. Beech-Nut, initially 
positioned as a low-priced brand, underwent a struggle 
from 1985 through 1989 under Nestle ownership to become 
a premium brand with prices higher than Gerber's. In 
1989, when Ralston acquired Beech-Nut from Nestle, 
Ralston decided to elevate its price structure to be 
competitive with Gerber's. Beech-Nut traditionally has had 
a strong presence in New England, New York, and Eastern 
Pennsylvania. 
 
Many retailers have come to carry only two brands of 
baby food. Gerber is almost always one of the two. 
Significantly, each company has two pricing levels: the list 
price and the transaction price. The list price, the price 
officially announced by the company, is used as a base 
price from which customer discounts and allowances are 
deducted to obtain the transaction price. The transaction 
price is the price at which the wholesalers and supermarket 
chains actually buy the baby food; the price takes into 
account discounts, bulk-purchasing, rebates, regional 
considerations, and special promotions. The 
manufacturers, however, do not offer discounts across the 
board; at any given time, one customer may pay a different 
price than the next customer for the same product. Heinz 
claims that it sells more than 80% of its baby food at prices 
below list. In addition, Heinz and Beech-Nut do not 
implement uniform national price increases, often delaying 
increases in particular geographic regions. 
 
The plaintiffs' foremost allegation is that the defendants 
exchanged information with each other regarding future 
price increases before announcing any increases to the 
public. Plaintiffs maintain that the defendants had no 
legitimate business reason for informing each other of price 
increases before publicly announcing them except for their 
motivation to conspire. The plaintiffs allege that Gerber, the 
dominant company in the industry and the price leader, 
would decide to raise its prices and, if the other two 
competitors did not follow the price increase immediately, 
the time-gap between Gerber's price increase and the 
increases of the other companies would be of sufficient 
length to disturb their respective market shares. Therefore, 
giving advance notice solved this problem. The plaintiffs 
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claim that because advance notice did occur, this evidences 
that an agreement economically to conspire among the 
defendants was in place. 
 
Following exhaustive discovery over a period of three 
years, the District Court granted summary judgment for all 
defendants on the ground that plaintiffs' case was "sorely 
lacking" in any evidence pointing to an agreement among 




The Underlying Legal Concepts 
 
The legal fulcrum for the plaintiffs' complaint is Section 
1 of the Sherman Act. Section 1 provides: "Every contract, 
combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or 
conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the 
several States, or with foreign nations, is hereby declared to 
be illegal." 15 U.S.C. S 1. The existence of an agreement is 
the hallmark of a Section 1 claim. Alvord-Polk, Inc. v. F. 
Schumacher & Co., 37 F.3d 996, 999 (3d Cir. 1994). 
Liability is necessarily based on some form of "concerted 
action." Id.3 Indeed, we have defined a conspiracy as a 
"conscious commitment to a common scheme designed to 
achieve an unlawful objective." Edward J. Sweeney & Sons, 
Inc. v. Texaco, Inc., 637 F.2d 105, 111 (3d Cir. 1980). In 
other words, " `unity of purpose or a common design and 
understanding or a meeting of the minds in an unlawful 
arrangement' must exist to trigger Section 1 liability." 
Alvord-Polk, 37 F.3d at 999, (quoting Copperweld Corp. v. 
Independence Tube Corp., 467 U.S. 752, 771 (1984)). 
 
In determining whether certain concerted action amounts 
to an unreasonable restraint this court applies one of two 
methods of analysis. See e.g. Rossi v. Standard Roofing, 
156 F.3d 452, 461 (3d Cir. 1998). The concerted action is 
either analyzed (1) through the per se sta ndard, which 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
3. The phrase "concerted action" is often used as shorthand for any form 
of activity meeting the Section 1 " `contract . . . combination or 
conspiracy' requirement." Bogosian v. Gulf Oil Corp., 561 F.2d 434, 445- 
46 (3d Cir. 1977) quoting L. Sullivan, Law of Anti-Trusts, p. 312 (1977). 
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presumes that the questionable conduct has anti- 
competitive effects without comprehensive inquiry into 
whether the concerted action produced adverse, anti- 
competitive effects, or (2) through the so-called rule of 
reason, a case-by-case method that involves consideration 
of all of the circumstances of a case to decide whether 
certain concerted action should be prohibited because it 
amounts to an anti-competitive practice. The analysis to be 
applied depends on the essence of concerted action in 
dispute. Id. 
 
Generally, price-fixing agreements are considered a per se 
violation of the Sherman Act. See United States v. Socony- 
Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 218 (1940). Per se violations 
include those types of restraints on competition that are in 
and of themselves considered unreasonable because "their 
pernicious effect on competition and lack of any redeeming 
virtue are conclusively presumed to be unreasonable." 
United States v. Cargo Service Stations, Inc., 657 F.2d 676, 
682 n.4 (5th Cir. Unit B 1981) (quoting Northern Pacific Ref. 
v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5 (1958)). However, when the 
evidence consists of mere exchanges of information the 
presumption vanishes. See United States v. United States 
Gypsum Co., 438 U.S. 422, 441 n.16 (1978). Exchanges of 
information are not considered a per se violation because 
"such practices can in certain circumstances increase 
economic efficiency and render markets more, rather than 
less, competitive." Gypsum, Id. at 441 n.16. Therefore, such 
exchanges of information are evaluated under a rule of 
reason analysis. 
 
This court has previously articulated what Section 1 rule 
of reason analysis entails. We laid down four steps of proof 
that a plaintiff must present: (1) that the defend ants 
contracted, combined or conspired among each other; 
(2) that the combination or conspiracy produced ad verse 
anti-competitive effects within the relevant product and 
geographic markets; (3) that the objects of and co nduct 
pursuant to the contract or conspiracy were illegal; and 
(4) that the plaintiffs were injured as a proximat e result of 
that conspiracy. J.F. Fesser, Inc. v. Serv-A-Portion, Inc., 909 
F.2d 1524, 1541 (3d Cir. 1990).4 Under the rule of reason, 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
4. The District Court disposed of plaintiffs' case under the first prong 
of 
Fesser; it did not reach prongs (2), (3), and (4). Only Nestle questioned 
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all the evidence presented must be weighed to determine 
whether the defendants' purported price fixing practices 






Although there are some subordinate questions, the 
instant case stands or falls on the question whether the 
plaintiffs produced sufficient probative evidence to meet the 
demanding standard of proof required in the context of an 
antitrust case. Accordingly, we turn to an analysis of the 
voluminous evidence introduced by the plaintiffs. 
 
The plaintiffs have produced extensive circumstantial 
evidence, but claim that their direct evidence sufficiently 
proves a price-fixing conspiracy. They spiritedly claim that 
their direct evidence of reciprocal price exchanges and a 
collusive truce is sufficient to support a Section 1 
conspiracy claim. Direct evidence in a Section 1 conspiracy 
must be evidence that is explicit and requires no inferences 
to establish the proposition or conclusion being asserted. 
As we noted recently in Rossi, with direct evidence "the fact 
finder is not required to make inferences to establish facts." 
156 F.3d at 466. 
 
The plaintiffs heavily rely on the deposition testimony of 
Brian Anderson, formerly employed by Heinz as a sales 
representative until 1986, and Marshall Gibbs, formerly 
employed by Heinz as a district sales manager until 1984. 
Their testimony reveals that they were required to submit 
competitive activity reports to their superiors concerning 
baby food sales from information they picked up from 
competitor sales representatives. The information they 
obtained was verbal and usually passed on orally to their 
superiors. There was no organized system to secure the 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
whether the defendants provided sufficient proof of fact of injury and 
damages under prong (4). Because the District Court did not address 
and the defendants did not argue that plaintiffs' evidence fell short with 
respect to prongs (2) and (3), we do not consider them. 
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information; it was obtained sporadically, verbally, and 
informally in conversations among the representatives. 
Anderson testified that his supervisor, Area Manager Fred 
Runk, informed him on a regular basis before any 
announcement to the trade as to when Heinz's competitors 
were going to increase the wholesale list prices of their baby 
food products. Anderson also testified that he exchanged 
future price information with various sales representatives 
of Beech-Nut and Gerber as to whether Heinz, Beech-Nut, 
and Gerber were planning to announce future price 
increases. Moreover, according to Anderson, such 
exchanges between sales representatives were common in 
the baby food industry. 
 
Gibbs similarly testified that he personally exchanged 
pricing information with sales representatives of the other 
companies. Specifically, Gibbs stated "[I] would, obviously, 
get with another rep., and say, you can give me and I can 
give you and we can pat each other on the back and get 
this information in because we both have the same 
accountability." Beech-Nut also required its sales 
representatives to gather competitive information. In their 
depositions, Neils Hoyvald, President of Beech-Nut prior to 
1988, and James Nichols, who succeeded Hoyvald, testified 
that it was company policy for sales representatives to 
gather and report pricing information of their competitors. 
 
On September 1, 1986, Gerber's New York Division 
Manager, Don Beaudoin, sent a competitive price change 
and activity report to Gerber's Regional Manager for the 
Eastern Region and Vice President of Sales. Attached to the 
report was an unsigned Beech-Nut announcement of a 
forthcoming September 29, 1986 price increase. Beech-Nut 
executives admitted that Gerber appears to have had 
possession of the September 29 price increase 
announcement as early as September 1, 1986, but claim 
ignorance as to how Gerber obtained the document. 
 
Beech-Nut obtained advance notice of a February 13, 
1989 Gerber price increase at least a week before it was 
announced to the trade. Each page of the memorandum 
was stamped "HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL." The memorandum 
instructed the division managers not to notify their 
accounts of the price increase until February 13, 1989, the 
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effective date of the increase. Gerber did not notify the 
trade of the price increase until February 13, 1989, yet 
Beech-Nut knew of the increase at least as early as 
February 6, 1989. 
 
Gerber had advance knowledge of a May 1, 1989 Beech- 
Nut price increase at least a day before it was announced 
to the trade. A March 31, 1989 memorandum from Norman 
Knorr of Gerber confirms this by describing a March 27 
conference call between Gerber's Al Gorsky, Vice President 
of Sales, and Gerber's regional managers. The 
memorandum stated in part: "We received a report from the 
Boston Division that a [Beech-Nut] price increase will be in 
effect on May 1. Details were telexed to the field." 
 
Beech-Nut had advance knowledge of a planned February 
1990 Gerber list price increase as early as two months and 
no less than eight days before its announcement to the 
trade on December 28, 1989. In an October 13, 1989 
memorandum to Theuer, Joseph Gaeto, Vice President of 
Marketing of Beech-Nut, wrote, "I strongly suspect that 
Gerber will increase their prices on Friday, March 2, 1990." 
In a December 20, 1989, memorandum to Beech-Nut's 
regional and zone managers, Humbarger (Beech-Nut's 
Operation Manager in New York) stated "We have heard 
very strong rumors that Gerber will most likely increase 
their base price in February, 1990."5  
 
In a competitive activity report one week before Beech- 
Nut's announcement on November 27, 1991, of a list price 
increase that excluded the West Coast, Dick Grainger, 
Gerber's Los Angeles District Manager, reported to Jerri 
Jean Wilson, Gerber Director of Field Communications, a 
"[r]umor that Beech-Nut will not advance prices for at least 
three months [on the West Coast]." The same day, Grainger 
also sent a report to Gerber's Vice-President, Al Gorsky, 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
5. Plaintiffs assert that in the baby food industry a communication from 
a competitor is referred to as "rumor," a term of art. This 
characterization is attributed to an exchange between plaintiffs' counsel 
and Jerri Jean Wilson, Gerber's Director of Field Communications, 
during her deposition, where she stated that "rumor" means chit-chat 
that occurs among employees of the defendants on "the street." 
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that advised "Beech-Nut has no plans for a price increase 
within the next three months." 
 
A September 25, 1992, e-mail from Beech-Nut's Bob 
Butcher related the details of a conversation between 
Beech-Nut's District Manager Joe Piscola and Frank 
Garritano of Gerber, in which Piscola told Garritano that 
Beech-Nut would not be taking "a price increase at this 
time." A handwritten note on the Gerber e-mail printout 
stated, "Keep me advised on any price increases by 
competition! We will be in a world of hurt if Heinz/Beech- 
Nut does not increase." Al Gorsky, among others at Gerber, 
received copies of this document. James Nichols, President 
of Beech-Nut, also testified that at least two to three times 
a year Mick Humbarger would inform him of conversations 
between Beech-Nut and Gerber personnel in metropolitan 
New York. 
 
Plaintiffs also point to a varied assortment of documents 
and memoranda they introduced into evidence, the most 
significant of which are: (1) A September 1, 198 6 Gerber 
memorandum which plaintiffs assert proves that Gerber 
had advance knowledge of a September 29, 1986 Beech- 
Nut list price increase on all of its products. Notice of the 
increase was not officially sent to the Beech-Nut brokers 
and sales force for announcement to the trade until 
September 4, 1986. (2) A February 6, 1989, letter from 
Nestle's President, Theuer, to the Chairman of his Board 
notifying him that "[w]e have unconfirmed news from the 
trade that on February 13, Gerber will increase prices." On 
February 10, Theuer wrote that "it is confirmed that Gerber 
will increase prices on February 13, 1989." Theuer testified 
that he assumes that he received this information from the 
trade, in light of his language in the February 6 memo. 
(3) Plaintiffs' remaining examples show that Gerber knew of 
a Beech-Nut price increase one day before it was 
announced. 
 
In addition, plaintiffs point to defendants' expert Dr. 
William C. Myslinski's testimony that "when two defendants 
. . . get together and they mutually exchange information" 
and "indicate to each other what they are going to charge 
in the future," such conduct "would be consistent with a 
conspiracy." In addition, they highlight the defendants' 
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failure to explain how Gerber knew of the September 4, 
1986 price increase three days early, when Beech-Nut's 
sales force and customers were not told of the increase 
until September 4. 
 
Furthermore, the plaintiffs submitted evidence of a 1984 
Heinz communication from Gerber's area manager, Ron 
Coble, to his superior, Terry Ryan. The background for 
Coble's communications, the plaintiffs claim, was an 
important shift in the early 1980s in the baby food 
industry. Baby food distributors realized that it was no 
longer economically beneficial to stock each of the 
defendants' products. They decided to turn to a "two-brand" 
system and stock the market leader, Gerber, and either 
Heinz or Beech-Nut. Coble's memorandum to Ryan stated: 
 
       In Nov. 1983, I was told by MDI management [a 
       prospective Heinz customer] that they wanted to stock 
       only two brands of baby food -- Gerber and someone 
       else. Their main objective was to stock the lines that 
       were preferred by the retailers. I advised them that we 
       would make every effort to secure a majority base of 
       distribution. However, with our "truce" in effect, I knew 
       our hands were tied. 
 
The plaintiffs regard this memorandum as significant direct 
evidence of price-fixing. At his deposition, Coble testified 
that he did not recall why he used the word "truce," but 
believed that it referred to the Heinz Marketing Department. 
They, he stated, made the policies "based on costs" as to 
the territories where the company was to do business. 
 
The plaintiffs hypothesize that in the early 80s, changes 
in consumers' purchasing practices caused a change in the 
wholesalers' market strategy that "provoked a new market 
dynamic characterized by a price struggle between Heinz 
and Beech-Nut for the second brand position, a struggle in 
which Gerber was forced to join in order to preserve its own 
market share." Although this episode does not appear to 
relate to price-fixing but to unfair competition, the plaintiffs 
argue that the "truce" had the effect and purpose of 
enabling the defendants to fix prices. 
 
The plaintiffs assert that their version of the "truce" is 
supported by statements and correspondence from other 
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Heinz employees. For instance, the plaintiffs note that Tim 
Senft, Heinz's Manager of Sales Planning, explained to a 
subordinate that "[t]he days of 3/store are gone - B/N's 
[Beech-Nut's] move to Stages[6] nationally should abate the 
war. We don't want it to start again." 
 
Furthermore, the plaintiffs contend that the impact of the 
"truce" on the level of competition is evidenced by (1) a 
letter from Neils L. Hoyvald, President of Beech-Nut, to 
James Biggar, Chairman of Nestle Enterprises, Inc., in 
which he states that they were able to accomplish"[t]he 
elimination of all competitive counter offers, which was 
stopped late 1983 and the situation has held, with Heinz 
following our initiative";7 (2) a 1984 internal Heinz 
memorandum from Holscher and Haviland requesting 
extension of an allowance on strained food in the Florida 
district, which contained a statement that Heinz lost 
distribution in fiscal year 1983 in Miami "and since Heinz 
has taken the position that we do not want to [pursue] the 
business in Miami," a Beech-Nut market App. at 1739; and 
(3) a note to a 1985 Heinz memorandum from Senft t o 
Costello stating: "There are people who think . .. [that 
Heinz's] . . . previous attempts to gain distribution in Miami 
. . . started the last `Tet Offensive.' " 
 
To boost their claim that the 1984 "truce" in price 
competition existed, plaintiffs point to the absence of any 
list price increases for the two and one half years preceding 
the "truce," but note that after it became effective, list 
prices increased at least once a year. Plaintiffs also claim 
that Heinz's refusal to enter the Chicago market 
demonstrated the truce's success. 
 
We have reviewed the documentary evidence and the 
testimony of Anderson and Gibbs and we conclude that 
they do not make out a case of direct evidence. The 
plaintiffs here have been unable to present evidence of 
conspiracy to fix prices without drawing on inferences from 
all of the evidence they have introduced. The direct 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
6. According to plaintiffs, "Stages" marked the beginning of Beech-Nut's 
effort to displace Gerber as the premium price brand of baby food and 
end its competition with Heinz for the more price sensitive consumer. 
 
7. At the time, Beech-Nut was owned by Nestle. 
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evidence evinces only an exchange of information among 
the defendants. Accordingly, we apply the rule of reason. 
Amey, 758 F.2d at 1505. 
 
We, therefore, turn to the parallel pricing evidence on 







In the absence of direct evidence, the plaintiffs may 
nevertheless support their claim with circumstantial 
evidence of conscious parallelism. Weit v. Continental 
Illinois National Bank & Trust Company, 641 F.2d 457, 462 
(7th Cir. 1981). Conscious parallelism, sometimes called 
oligopolistic price coordination, is described as the process 
"not in itself unlawful, by which firms in a concentrated 
market might in effect share monopoly power, setting their 
prices at a prefixed maximizing, supracompetitive level by 
recognizing their shared economic interests and their 
interdependence with respect to price and output 
decisions." Brooke Group, 509 U.S. 209, 227 (1993). The 
theory of conscious parallelism is that uniform conduct of 
pricing by competitors permits a court to infer the existence 
of a conspiracy between those competitors. Todorov v. DCH 
Healthcare Authority, 921 F.2d 1438, 1456 n.30 (11th Cir. 
1991). The theory is generally applied to highly 
concentrated markets where few sellers exist and where 
they establish their prices, not by express agreement, but 
rather in a consciously parallel fashion. Shapiro v. General 
Motors, 472 F. Supp. 636, 647 (D.Md. 1979). Thus, when 
two or more competitors in such a market act separately 
but in parallel fashion in their pricing decisions, this may 
provide probative evidence of the existence of an 
understanding by the competitors to fix prices. Todorov, 
921 F.2d at 1456 n.30. 
 
In an oligopolistic market, meaning a market where there 
are few sellers, interdependent parallelism can be a 
necessary fact of life but be the result of independent 
pricing decisions. 
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       [I]n a market served by three large companies, each 
       firm must know that if it reduces its price and 
       increases its sales at the expense of its rivals, they will 
       notice the sales loss, identify the cause, and probably 
       respond. In short, each firm is aware of its impact 
       upon the others. Though each may independently 
       decide upon its own course of action, any rational 
       decision must take into account the anticipated 
       reaction of the other two firms. Whenever rational 
       decision-making requires an estimate of the impact of 
       any decision on the remaining firms and an estimate of 
       their response, decisions are said to be 
       "interdependent." Because of their mutual awareness, 
       oligopolists' decisions may be interdependent although 
       arrived at independently." 
 
Areeda, Antitrust Law S 1429 (1986). See Bogosian v. Gulf 
Oil Corp., 561 F.2d 434, 446 (3d Cir. 1977). 
 
Because the evidence of conscious parallelism is 
circumstantial in nature, courts are concerned that they do 
not punish unilateral, independent conduct of competitors. 
Matsushita Elec. Industrial Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 
U.S. 574, 594 (1985). They therefore require that evidence 
of a defendant's parallel pricing be supplemented with "plus 
factors." Petruzzi's IGA v. Darling-Delaware, 988 F.2d 1224, 
1243 (3d Cir. 1993). The simple term "plus factors" refers 
to "the additional facts or factors required to be proved as 
a prerequisite to finding that parallel action amounts to a 
conspiracy." Areeda, Antitrust Law S 1433(e). They are 
necessary conditions for the conspiracy inference. Venzie 
Corp. v. United States Mineral Products Co., 521 F.2d 1309, 
1314 (3d Cir. 1975); Areeda, S1434. They show that the 
allegedly wrongful conduct of the defense was conscious 
and not the result of independent business decisions of the 
competitors. The plus factors may include, and often do, 
evidence demonstrating that the defendants: (1) ac ted 
contrary to their economic interests, and (2) were  motivated 
to enter into a price fixing conspiracy. See Petruzzi's, 998 
F.2d at 1242. 
 
The concept of "action against self-interest" is ambiguous 
and one of its meanings could merely constitute a 
restatement of interdependence. As the court pointed out in 
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Coleman v. Cannon Oil Company, 849 F. Supp. 1458, 1467 
(N.D. Ala. 1993), refusing to raise or lower prices unless 
rivals do the same could be against a firm's self-interest but 
nevertheless could spring from independent behavior. 
Similarly, conspiratorial motivation is ambiguous because it 
"can describe mere interdependent behavior and, therefore, 
it could mean that interdependent behavior is a Sherman 
Act Section 1 conspiracy." Areeda, S 1434(c). Thus, no 
conspiracy should be inferred from ambiguous evidence or 
from mere parallelism when defendants' conduct can be 
explained by independent business reasons. 
 
Once the plaintiffs have presented evidence of the 
defendants' consciously parallel pricing and supplemented 
this evidence with plus factors, a rebuttable presumption of 
conspiracy arises. Todorov, 921 F.2d at 1456 n.30. "[T]he 
mere presence of one or more of these `plus factors' does 
not necessarily mandate the conclusion that there was an 
illegal conspiracy between the parties, for the court may 
still conclude, based upon the evidence before it, that the 
defendants acted independently of one another, and not in 
violation of antitrust laws." Balaklaw v. Lovell, 822 F. 
Supp. 892 (N.D. N.Y. 1993); Todorov, 921 F.2d at 1456 
n.30. 
 
In an effort to reinforce their claim of collusive price- 
fixing, plaintiffs presented the testimony of an expert for the 
purpose of showing a pattern of parallel price increases in 
each of the five baby food product categories throughout 
the certified time period, except for the First Food category 
in August 1992. The plaintiffs requested Dr. Albert 
Madansky to conduct statistical analyses of the defendants' 
list price increases for the period January 1989 through 
December 1992. He concluded that the results of his 
analyses established a pattern of parallel pricing by the 
defendants. Dr. Madansky's conclusion is depicted infive 
charts. The charts represent each of the five categories of 
baby food: First Foods, Second Foods, Third Foods, Cereals, 
and Juices. 
 
Through his analysis of the defendants' average monthly 
list prices, Dr. Madansky further concluded that 
transaction prices likewise increased in parallel fashion 
from 1989 to 1992. Again, similar to what he did with list 
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prices, his analysis of transaction price trend lines is 
depicted in five charts that reflect the five categories of baby 
foods. According to Dr. Madansky, the charts show that the 
defendants' prices moved upward in parallel fashion on 
99.5% of the total volume analyzed. 
 
The plaintiffs argue documentary and testimonial 
evidence also confirm that the defendants engaged in 
parallel pricing and prove that the price increases resulted 
from concerted action by the defendants. They point to an 
internal Beech-Nut memo of February 24, 1989, from 
Joseph Gaeto, Beech-Nut's Vice-President of Marketing, to 
Theuer stating: "We have taken a position [of] parity with 
Gerber to reflect our current plan for a price increase this 
year." In addition, Beech-Nut's 1988 Long Term Plan 
pontificated "Gerber will accept the price leadership of 
Beech-Nut and will accept price increases as a means of 
improving profitability." They also cite the testimony of 
Heinz's area manager, Ron Coble, that Heinz's "selling 
philosophy" from 1970 to the early 1990s was to sell their 
products at 29È a case below the prices of Beech-Nut and 
Gerber on all 24-pack merchandise. Plaintiffs argue that 
the maintenance of more or less constant differentials 
between defendants' prices is clear evidence of parallel 
pricing. 
 
The plaintiffs also contend that the evidence they 
produced showed that the defendants' pricing was 
"conscious." For this purpose, they rely heavily on the 
reciprocal exchange in pricing information previously 
referred to, including the deposition testimony of Anderson 
and Gibbs. The plaintiffs therefore argue that sales 
representatives of each defendant, largely at the behest of 
senior management and mostly by word of mouth, 
maintained a continuous network to exchange price 
information as well as a system to communicate that 
information to executive decision makers. The plaintiffs 
claim that the evidence shows that the defendants on a 
consistent basis ordered their sales representatives to 
gather competitive information, such as their competitors' 
pricing plans and strategies. The plaintiffs aver that once 
this information was obtained, the sales representatives 
reported the information to their area or territory manager, 
who in turn passed the information on to their superiors. 
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In addition, the plaintiffs argue that the defendants' 
pricing data represents parallel list and transaction pricing. 
They assert that following the "truce" an understanding 
existed among the defendants not to intrude upon the 
other's position in the market place, which culminated in 
an agreement to jointly coordinate and implement price 
increases. In support of their theory of the defendants' price 
parallelism, plaintiffs claim that their expert's testimony 
shows statistical analysis of the defendants' list price 
increases per pack between January 1989 and December 
1992. The plaintiffs also contend that the parallel list price 
increases caused the transaction prices to increase and, 
thus, the transaction prices suffered from parallel pricing 
as well. Specifically, as to the period certified for the class 
action, January 1, 1989 to December 31, 1992, plaintiffs 
maintain that defendants' list prices and actual transaction 
prices were higher than they would have been had the 




Summary Judgment Principles 
 
This court's review of the District Court's grant of 
summary judgment is plenary. Erie Telecommunications, 
Inc. v. City of Erie, 853 F.2d 1084, 1093 (3d Cir. 1988). We 
evaluate the evidence using the same standard the District 
Court applied in reaching its decision. 
 
Summary judgment is warranted where "there is no 
genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving 
party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. 
Civ. P. 56(c). In the context of an antitrust case, the 
nonmoving party's burden "is no different than any other 
case." Big Apple BMW, Inc. v. BMW of North America, Inc., 
974 F.2d 1358, 1363 (3d Cir. 1992). Hence, "summary 
judgment should be granted if, after drawing all reasonable 
inferences from the underlying facts in the light most 
favorable to the nonmoving party, the court concludes that 
there is no genuine issue of material fact to be resolved at 
trial and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a 
matter of law." Petruzzi's IGA v. Darling-Delaware, 998 F.2d 
at 1230 (3d Cir. 1993). 
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The extent of what constitutes a reasonable inference in 
the context of an antitrust case, however, is somewhat 
different from cases in other branches of the law in that 
"antitrust law limits the range of permissible inferences 
from ambiguous evidence in a S 1 case." Matsushita, 475 
U.S. at 588. The acceptable inferences which we can draw 
from circumstantial evidence vary with the plausibility of 
the plaintiffs' theory and the danger associated with such 
inferences. Petruzzi's, 998 F.2d at 1232. Therefore, the 
Supreme Court has held in the antitrust context "that 
conduct consistent with permissible competition as with 
illegal conspiracy does not, standing alone, support an 
inference of antitrust conspiracy." Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 
588, (citing Monsanto, 465 U.S. at 764). Thus, to withstand 
a motion for summary judgment "a plaintiff seeking 
damages for a violation of S 1 must present evidence that 
tends to exclude the possibility that the alleged competitors 
acted independently." Id. The reason, of course, is that 
mistaken inferences in such a context "are especially costly 
because they chill the very conduct the antitrust laws are 
designed to protect." Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 594. 
 
In deciding whether summary judgment is warranted, the 
District Court may not weigh the evidence or make 
credibility determinations. Big Apple BMW, 974 F.2d at 
1363. Moreover, the non-movants' evidence should be 
analyzed as a whole and not be tightly compartmentalized 
to see if together it supports an inference of concerted 
action. Big Apple BMW, 974 F.2d at 1364. 
 
A plaintiff in a Section 1 conspiracy can establish a case 
solely on circumstantial evidence and the reasonable 
inferences to be drawn therefrom, and the movant 
defendant for summary judgment bears the burden of 
proving that drawing inferences of unlawful behavior is 
unreasonable. Petruzzi's, 998 F.2d at 1230. "Nonetheless, 
in drawing favorable inferences from underlying facts, a 
court must remember that often a fine line separates 
unlawful concerted action from legitimate business 
practices." Id. Therefore, care must be exercised to ensure 
that inferences drawn of unlawful behavior from ambiguous 
evidence do not infringe upon the defendants' freedom. Id. 
Thus, the court must ascertain whether the plaintiffs have 
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presented "evidence that is sufficiently unambiguous" 
showing that the defendants conspired. Matsushita, 475 
U.S. at 597. 
 





Analysis of the Evidence 
 
The District Court carefully considered the plaintiffs' 
evidence concerning the reciprocal exchange of price 
information by the defendants. The court concluded that 
the evidence did not support an inference of a conspiracy to 
fix prices but portrayed nothing more than intense efforts 
on the part of three large and strong competing companies 
in the baby food industry to ascertain: 
 
       [w]hat their competitors would be doing with regard to 
       pricing, promotions and products. . . . These instances 
       do not allow the inference of some conspiracy to fix 
       prices. Much of the specific instances cited by plaintiffs 
       concern not pricing information, but promotional or 
       product information of certain defendants which were 
       reported by other defendants." D.C. Op. at p. 27. 
 
With respect to the written documents of one competitor 
found in the files of another, the court determined that 
many of them reflect competitive information concerning 
the discontinuance of products or changes in product 
ingredients or in packaging. It concluded that the presence 
of this information was consistent with independent action 
and not grounds for assuming "some shadowy conspiracy." 
Id. 
 
The plaintiffs assert that the exchange of pricing 
information by lower level employees is sufficient to defeat 
a motion for summary judgment in Section 1 cases.8 We 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
8. At oral argument, the plaintiffs cited the following cases as authority 
for this assertion: Vernon v. Southern Calif. Edison Co., 955 F.2d 1361 
(9th Cir. 1992); In re Coordinated Pretrial Proceedings, 906 F.2d 432 (9th 
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disagree. Evidence of sporadic exchanges of shop talk 
among field sales representatives who lack pricing authority 
is insufficient to survive summary judgment. Krehl v. 
Baskin Robbins Ice Cream Co., 664 F.2d 1348, 1357 (9th 
Cir. 1982). Furthermore, to survive summary judgment, 
there must be evidence that the exchanges of information 
had an impact on pricing decisions. See Krehl, 664 F.2d at 
1357. Plaintiffs, for this purpose, rely on their expert's 
opinion that concerted action drove the transaction prices 
up 6.16%. 
 
The plaintiffs here contend that the holdings of United 
States v. Container Corp. of America, 393 U.S. 333 (1969) 
and United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 438 U.S. 
422 (1978) compel the conclusion that the evidence they 
presented concerning the exchange of future pricing 
information impacted the market as a whole and is more 
than sufficient to survive summary judgment. We do not 
agree. 
 
In Container Corp., the court held that the reciprocal 
exchange of price information pursuant to an agreement by 
the defendants was concerted action sufficient to establish 
a price-fixing conspiracy. It analogized the agreement 
among the defendants there with the "sophistication and 
well-supervised plan for the exchange of price information 
between competitors" in American Column & Lumber Co. v. 
United States, U.S. 257 U.S. 377 (1921) and the "elaborate 
plan for the exchange of price data among competitors" in 




Cir. 1990); Rosenfield v. Falcon Jet Corp., 701 F.Supp. 1053 (D.N.J. 
1988). However, we conclude that none of these cases support the 
plaintiffs. Vernon did not involve price-fixing; rather, it concerned 
whether the defendant denied the plaintiff access to certain power 
transmission lines. In Pretrial Proceedings, testimony indicated that 
upper level executives engaged in secret conversations regarding product 
pricing. Id. at 450. Similarly, in Rosenfield, testimony showed that 
several upper level executives "were aware of the price information 
exchange and considered the data obtained by sales engineers to set the 
price of business jets." Id. at 1064. 
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In Container Corp., the plaintiffs presented direct 
evidence of an agreement among the defendants to 
exchange pricing information, as well as evidence that once 
a defendant had the competitors' pricing information, in a 
"majority of instances," the defendant quoted the same 
price as his competitor. This compared to evidence of 
periods where there were no pricing exchanges and 
"exceptionally sharp and vigorous price reductions 
resulted." See 393 U.S. at 340 (Fortas, J., concurring). 
Conversely, in Gypsum, the Court could not have been 
more clear: "The exchange of price data and other 
information among competitors does not invariably have 
anticompetitive effects; indeed such practices can in certain 
circumstances increase economic efficiency and render 
markets more, rather than less, competitive." 438 U.S. at 
443 n.16. 
 
The plaintiffs also complain that the District Court 
improperly weighed Anderson's testimony and failed to even 
consider Gibbs' testimony. Anderson was a salesman, who 
characterized his status as "a little mouse." He had no 
authority to set the prices for the baby food he sold. His 
superior did not instruct him to provide competitors with 
information. He considered himself a good salesman, and, 
therefore, his practice was to garner as much information 
as he could find "in the street" about the competition. 
Whatever competitive information he acquired he passed on 
to his superior. The information came from chit-chat during 
chance encounters in the field among competitors' 
employees with whom he was acquainted. Runk, his 
superior, never directed him to disseminate Heinz price 
information to competitors in the field. 
 
We have held previously that communications between 
competitors do not permit an inference of an agreement to 
fix prices unless "those communications rise to the level of 
an agreement, tacit or otherwise." Alvord-Polk, 37 F.3d at 
1013. See also Amey, 758 F.2d at 1505 (11th Cir. 
1985)(Exchange of pricing information by itself is an 
insufficient basis upon which to allow an inference of 
agreement to fix prices); Market Force Inc. v. Wauwatosa 
Realty Co., 906 F.2d 1167, 1173 (7th Cir. 1990)("[i]t is well 
established that evidence of informal communications 
 
                                26 
  
among several parties does not unambiguously support an 
inference of a conspiracy.") Gathering competitors' price 
information can be consistent with independent competitor 
behavior. See e.g., Stephen Jay Photography Ltd. v. Olan 
Mills, Inc., 903 F.2d 988, 996 (4th Cir. 1990); Wallace v. 
Bank of Bartlett, 55 F.3d 1166, 1169 (6th Cir. 1995). 
 
The District Court appropriately discounted Gibbs's 
testimony entirely because he gave it in another proceeding 
involving Heinz's vinegar product, not baby food. Neither 
Gerber nor Beech-Nut manufactured vinegar. Moreover, he 
testified that (1) any communications he had wit h 
competitors were neither related to setting the price of 
vinegar nor related to any agreement with competition on 
the price of vinegar, (2) the information he commu nicated 
was all current or public, and (3) Heinz generally  did not 
act on any information obtained through those 
communications. We see no error in the court's treatment 
of Gibbs's testimony. 
 
The plaintiffs also argue that the assortment of 
memoranda found in the files of the defendants concerning 
advance prices of competition, one or two of which were 
unexplained, proved "a pervasive exchange of confidential 
information concerning future promotions." We do not 
believe that the mere possession of competitive memoranda 
is evidence of concerted action to fix prices. In a highly 
competitive industry, as is the baby food industry, intensely 
dependent on marketing strategy, it makes common sense 
to obtain as much information as possible of the pricing 
policies and marketing strategy of one's competitors. 
 
       The fact that the price information about one company 
       is found in a competitor's files or an employee reports 
       a competitor's pricing policy to his home office and the 
       two companies charge similar prices for their products, 
       without more, cannot support an inference that the 
       two competitors entered into an agreement to share 
       prices. To successfully raise an inference that two 
       competitors agreed to share price information, a 
       complainant must produce some evidence which tends 
       to exclude the possibility that the competitors acted 
       independently. 
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Stephen Jay Photography, 903 F.2d at 996 (citing 
Monsanto, 465 U.S. at 764). 
 
The plaintiffs stressed during trial and on appeal the 
significance of the evidence concerning the "truce." They 
argue that the District Court simply erred in its treatment 
of all the evidence presented regarding this incident. They 
contend that the District Court failed to discuss the 1984 
memorandum from Hoyvald to Biggar, in which Hoyvald 
stated that all large competitive counter-offers have been 
eliminated, or Heinz's rejection of McCloskey's 
recommendation for Heinz to enter the Chicago market in 
1988 and 1991. Further, they take issue with the court's 
conclusion that the 1984 truce memorandum was 
"irrelevant to Gerber" and "clearly as consistent with 
normal business conduct as it is with some alleged 
conspiracy between Heinz and Beech-Nut." 
 
The plaintiffs failed to present any evidence 
demonstrating that Gerber was involved in a "truce." In 
considering the evidence relating to the "truce," the District 
Court concluded: 
 
       [t]here is evidence that 1984 marked the end of a trade 
       war in the baby food business, and certain customers 
       at that time, in certain areas of the country, utilized a 
       "two-brand approach." This meant that those 
       customers would stock Gerber products and either 
       Heinz or Beech-Nut products. . . . The Court notes that 
       it would be irrelevant to Gerber if this truce did in fact 
       exist, so the Court declines to make the leap that 
       Gerber had any input into an alleged "truce." 
 
Op. at 33. As to Coble's explanation for his isolated, single 
use of the term in his 1984 memorandum, the District 
Court concluded that the deposition testimony of other 
Heinz employees "corroborate[d] the fact that Heinz was 
skittish about doing anything which might erupt in another 
conflagration in the industry. This evidence is clearly as 
consistent with normal business conduct as it is with some 
alleged conspiracy between Heinz and Beech-Nut." Id. at 
33-34. We agree. 
 
The "truce" expression relied on by the plaintiffs was 
largely intended to buttress their case on reciprocal price- 
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fixing. However, the single use of the term in a highly 
competitive business environment and in the face of 
continuing fierce competition is as consistent with 
independent behavior as it is with price-fixing. 
Furthermore, the explanation for the use of the term by an 
employee without price-fixing authority is more plausibly 
explained as an exercise of independent business judgment 
by Heinz not to enter a new market. The evidence reflects 
Heinz's strategic planning as to whether and when to 
pursue particular business opportunities. We are unwilling 
to question such business judgment. Furthermore, the 
price-fixing inferences that the plaintiffs would have us 
draw from this evidence, which relates ostensibly to 
business competition and not price-fixing, require us to 
make an unjustified jump in judgment that this record does 
not warrant, especially in the face of the District Court's 
conclusion. 
 
The plaintiffs place great weight on Heinz's decision not 
to invest in the Chicago and the Miami markets. 9 However, 
such investment required substantial capital expenditures 
and resource commitments. Only Heinz was in a position to 
decide whether it was in its best interest to make such 
commitments, particularly in light of its interests in many 
other products in the general food industry. Only it knew 
how much spending on promotion and allowances would be 
required to penetrate the Chicago market, and how much 
competitive resistance it would encounter, whether the cash 
flow generated would justify committing a portion of its 
finite marketing budget, or whether there were better 
opportunities elsewhere. We can discover no hard evidence 
that allowances and promotion activity was abandoned at 
the time or in the geographic territory referred to in these 
documents. 
 
Moreover, Coble's 1984 memorandum, which used the 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
9. Plaintiffs assert that Heinz's McCloskey strongly advocated that Heinz 
enter the Chicago market in 1988 and 1991 and its unwillingness to 
enter proves that the 1984 "truce" remained in place. Plaintiffs ignore, 
however, the effort of Heinz to enter the Chicago market in 1988, 
evidenced by its formal, written proposal to Dominick's, a large Chicago 
supermarket chain. Dominick's rejected the proposal. 
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term "truce," also reports aggressive competition: "We 
attempted to expand our distribution from July to 
November 1983, but were unsuccessful in obtaining any 
significant distribution gains. Every attempt to dislodge 
Beech-Nut was met with defensive programs that were 
substantial." Furthermore, there would be strategic issues 
for Heinz to consider, that might draw fire from its 
competitors. They could aggressively respond to Heinz's 
territorial expansion in the expanded area and in other 
territories that might prove the expansion to be eruptive, 
destructive, and expensive. These considerations may have 
weighed against the likelihood of long-run success in 
Heinz's ability to maintain its presence on retail shelves 
and gain market share in the face of its competitors' 
response. Such decisions are consistent with permissible, 
rational competitive conduct. We therefore hold that 
plaintiffs' evidence pertaining to the alleged "truce" is not 
sufficiently probative of unlawful concerted action. 
 
The plaintiffs argue that they presented substantial 
evidence that the defendants' list and transaction prices 
increased in parallel fashion. In addition to their expert's 
affidavit, they also state that the testimony of other 
witnesses and documentary evidence confirm that the price 
increases were attributable to the defendants' consciously 
parallel action. On appeal, therefore, they vigorously assert 
that the District Court overlooked and otherwise 
disregarded this important evidence of conspiratorial price- 
fixing. 
 
In the absence of direct evidence, as we previously stated, 
consciously parallel business behavior can be important 
circumstantial evidence from which to infer an agreement 
in violation of the Sherman Act. Weit, 641 F.2d at 462. 
Although "mere consciously parallel behavior alone is 
insufficient to prove a conspiracy, it is circumstantial 
evidence from which, when supplemented by additional 
evidence, an illegal agreement can be inferred." Petruzzi's, 
998 F.2d at 1242. In an oligopoly consisting of no more 
than three companies at one time and collectively 
controlling almost the entire market, there is pricing 
structure in which each company is likely aware of the 
pricing of its competitors. The District Court in this case 
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concluded that upon examining the charts prepared by 
plaintiffs' expert, Dr. Madansky, the defendants' prices were 
not parallel. The plaintiffs were "unable to show that 
defendants' prices moved in a parallel fashion. This is true 
both for list prices and transaction prices. . . . On this basis 
alone, plaintiffs' case fails." D.C. op. at 21. 
 
The District Court noted that there were many "clear 
instances," for example, when Gerber raised its prices and 
Beech-Nut lowered theirs or kept them the same. For 
instance, "in March of 1990, Gerber raised the prices . . . 
[and] [i]n that same period, Heinz lowered its prices." D. C. 
op. at 23-24. The court also pointed to many instances 
where Gerber either lowered its prices or kept them the 
same when Heinz and/or Beech-Nut raised theirs. Id. at 24. 
The court also observed upon examining Dr. Madansky's 
report that all during the alleged conspiracy period, "there 
were fifteen instances (out of 175) where Gerber, Beech- 
Nut, and Heinz all raised their prices. There were seven 
instances where the three lowered their prices, and there 
were five where they kept them the same." Thus, it 
concluded that "15.5% of the time, Gerber, Beech-Nut, and 
Heinz made similar pricing decisions. . . . That leaves, 
however, 84.5% of the time during which defendants priced 
their products differently." (Id. at 24). 
 
From our own analysis of the evidence, we perceive no 
error on the part of the District Court in concluding that 
the evidence was insufficient to prove conscious 
parallelism. Because Gerber controlled 70% of the market 
in baby foods and was the acknowledged leader in this 
industry, Gerber's pricing understandably may have had an 
influence on its competitors' pricing. Conscious parallelism, 
however, will not be inferred merely because the evidence 
tends to show that a defendant may have followed a 
competitor's price increase. See, e.g., Theatre Enterprises v. 
Paramount Film Dist. Corp., 346 U.S. 537, 541 (1954); 
Clamp-All Corp. v. Cast Iron Soil Pipe Inst., 851 F.2d 478, 
484 (1st Cir. 1988). 
 
The plaintiffs complain that the District Court 
disregarded the testimony of their expert, Dr. Madansky, 
with respect to parallelism. We can well understand the 
District Court's attitude toward this expert's testimony and 
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supporting charts. In an industry with hundreds of 
products and a pervasive policy of allowing discounts and 
promotional allowances to purchasers, allowances that 
varied even to the same customer if it conducted business 
in different geographical areas, charts and reports focusing 
on list prices rather than transactional prices have little 
value. "Especially in an oligopoly setting, in which price 
competition is most likely to take place through less 
observable and less regular means than list prices, it would 
be unreasonable to draw conclusions about the existence of 
tacit coordination or supracompetitive pricing from data 
that reflect only list prices." Brooke Group, 509 U.S. at 236. 
 
Yet, the plaintiffs focus on the defendants' list pricing. In 
their initial brief, they assert that Dr. Madansky proffered 
substantial, uncontroverted evidence from which a jury 
could find "list price parallelism." They also point to Dr. 
Madansky's January 14, 1997 affidavit in which he 
analyzed "defendants' list prices and submitted five charts 
. . . graphically depicting the parallel movement of 
defendants' list prices over time." Id. (Emphasis added) 
Without making any effort, or offering any explanation for 
his failure to do so, Dr. Madansky made no statistical 
analysis of the movement of defendants' transaction prices. 
His conclusion with respect to transaction prices is reached 
by simply comparing defendants' list prices over time with 
the corresponding trend line of average monthly transaction 
prices on a per pack basis to show that following list price 
increases, transaction prices increased. Dr. Madansky's 
original testimony and report made no reference to 
transactional prices. Dr. Madansky made no in-depth 
analysis of transaction prices. His affidavit of January 14, 
1997, came as a response to the District Court's request 
and arguments of defendants' counsel at the oral hearing 
on the motion for summary judgment. 
 
Furthermore, Dr. Madansky's analysis did not consider 
any transaction pricing for Nestle/Beech-Nut.10 Moreover, 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
10. Dr. Madansky initially set out to determine the prices paid by the 
plaintiffs to the defendants for baby food products. His results were 
based on "the monthly dollar-volume weighted average of the per ounce 
price paid by Gerber and Beech-Nut customers who qualified for pricing 
at the 40,000 lb. or over price bracket and by all Heinz customers for the 
baby foods comprising Gerber's First Foods, Second Foods, Third Foods, 
Juices, and Cereals categories . . . ." The purpose at the time apparently 
was to provide a basis for damages. 
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he relies on "trend lines" of average transaction prices, not 
actual prices of the other companies, to reach a conclusion 
that transaction prices increased following list price 
increases. We do not believe that trend lines of average 
prices are a reliable indicator of transactional prices. 
Moreover, a trend line showing an increase in transaction 
prices for baby foods during a period of the economy when 
general food prices were increasing is readily 
understandable and charts depicting it are not helpful as 
evidence of parallelism. See Consumer Price Index -- All 
Urban Consumers, Bureau of Labor Statistics, Food and 
Beverages, 1967-1998. 
 
We see a further weakness in the methodology of Dr. 
Madansky's report that also furnished a sufficient basis for 
the District Court to reject it as proof of parallelism. The 
defendants sold their baby food products by the case and 
priced their sales by the case. Dr. Madansky's report of 
conscious parallelism is predicated on a per ounce basis. In 
response to the criticism his initial report evoked at the 
summary judgment hearing, Dr. Madansky submitted his 
January 1997 affidavit in which he concluded that"a per 
pack (i.e. per unit) basis during the period January 1989 
through December 1992 in each product category reveal[ed] 
that defendants increased their list prices in parallel 
fashion." (Emphasis added). He then leaped to the 
conclusion, ipse dixit, that "[a] per case analysis . . . would 
yield the same results as [his] per pack analysis because 
case sizes in the relevant baby food categories did not 
change during the period." Again his conclusion is based on 
list prices. 
 
The plaintiffs also point to the charts provided in Dr. 
Madansky's January 1997 affidavit as proof that the 
defendants' prices exhibited parallel behavior. There are 31 
charts. Charts 1-5 represent a comparison of defendants' 
list price increases on a per pack (i.e. per unit) basis and 
purport to show that defendants' list prices increased in 
parallel fashion. However, the pertinent inquiry is on the 
prices actually paid, the transaction prices. Thus, these 
charts' probity is minimal. Charts 6-20 represent"[a] 
comparison of defendants' list price increases over time 
with the corresponding trend line of average monthly 
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transaction prices on a per pack basis." However, the 
defendants sell baby food to their customers by the case. 
Therefore, these charts do not reflect case transaction 
prices. 
 
Charts 21-26 purport to compare "defendants' list prices 
to defendants' monthly average transaction prices on a per 
pack basis in the month immediately preceding their next 
list price increase." These charts focus on Dr. Madansky's 
use of trend lines. These trend lines reveal nothing more 
than that the transaction prices tended to increase over 
time. However, such analysis has been explicitly rejected by 
the Supreme Court. "[R]ising prices do not themselves 
permit an inference of a collusive market dynamic. Even in 
a concentrated market, the occurrence of a price increase 
does not in itself permit a rational inference of conscious 
parallelism or supracompetitive pricing." Brooke Group, 509 
U.S. at 237. 
 
The explanation proffered by the plaintiffs for Dr. 
Madansky's calculations on a per ounce basis is that it 
provided a common unit for the defendants' products 
because they sold some of the same products in different 
size jars. The use of a per ounce calculation, however, 
especially when utilizing list prices, reflected prices within 
a fraction of one cent of each other. The District Court 
commented that such a methodology was at odds with 
marketing practices for "the industry does not use [per 
ounce prices] when setting list prices. Per ounce prices are 
necessarily within a fraction of one cent of each other due 
to the relatively minimal per ounce cost." D.C. Op. at 24. As 
the defendants observe, if Dr. Madansky had performed his 
analysis on the basis of quarter-ounces, the distribution 
prices would appear even closer together. They claim his 
conversion into ounces "is an attempt to mask the real 
price differential." The defendants argue that analyzing 
price differentials on a per ounce basis is misleading. 
 
       For example, by reducing prices from a per-case basis 
       to a per-ounce basis, plaintiffs reduced the unit of 
       measurement by a factor of almost 100 in the case of 
       Gerber Second Foods (one case equals approximately 
       96 ounces) and by a factor of 30 in the case of Gerber 
       First Foods (one case equals 30 ounces). When prices 
 
                                34 
  
       are measured properly, in terms of price per case, 
       plaintiffs cannot argue that each of the defendants' 
       prices are within cents of each other. 
 
In response to this telling criticism of the inappropriate 
use of the per-ounce calculation, Dr. Madansky's January 
affidavit moved to a per-pack comparison. He then leaps 
the gap to a per-case analysis. He accomplishes this with 
the aid of a slender, unsupported strand in his affidavit 
stating that a "per case analysis (adjusting for Gerber's 
smaller case size in First Foods) would yield the same 
results as my per ounce analysis because case sizes in the 
relevant baby food categories did not change during the 
period." This amounts to nothing more than an observation 
which adds little substance, if any, to his opinion. 
 
In their appeal to this court, the plaintiffs rely on the per- 
pack analysis made in Dr. Madansky's January affidavit. 
Although this is a more reasonable unit size, the 
defendants observe that the plaintiffs do not argue that the 
per-package analysis of defendants' list or transaction 
prices were within cents or fractions of cents of each other, 
nor could they. Moreover, the defendants argue that the 
step graphs generated by Dr. Madansky in his January 
1997 affidavit compress the time axes to a minute scale to 
create the illusion of parallel pricing. In addition, as we 
have previously mentioned, the step graphs are based on 
list prices and the accompanying charts (Numbers 27-31) 
depict average monthly price trend lines on a per pack 
basis. 
 
Even when measured in ounces, as the defendants' 
analysis of the Madansky data illustrates, the evidence 
shows that the defendants' actual transaction prices moved 
in different directions more often than not. The undisputed 
evidence shows similar disparities with respect to list 
prices: sometimes competitors did not follow price increases 
at all, other times they followed by less, sometimes by the 
same amount, and sometimes they followed only in certain 
geographic areas. 
 
With respect to the plaintiffs' contention that the District 
Court ignored substantial testimony of defendants' own 
employees that confirmed the parallel movement of 
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defendants' list prices, as well as their expert, we turn to 
the specific documents and testimony to which they point 
in support of this argument. The plaintiffs refer to two 
documents: (1) a February 24, 1989 memorandum from 
Joseph Gaeto, Beech-Nut Vice President of Marketing, to 
Richard Theuer, Beech-Nut's then President, stating "we 
have taken a position [of] parity with Gerber to reflect our 
current plan for a price increase," and (2), a Heinz 
communication dated Nov. 5, 1991, from employee Wyker 
to his superior that "requests approval to implement a 
Grocery Baby Food Price Increase to match the recently 
announced Gerber Price Increase." The plaintiffs note that, 
in sharp contrast to the District Court's conclusion, the 
defendants' own economic expert, Dr. Almarin Phillips, as 
well as Coble, testified that it was Heinz's general policy to 
maintain a "more or less constant differential" between 
Gerber's list prices and Heinz's list prices. Id. 
 
The District Court may not have specifically addressed 
this testimony but that does not mean the court ignored it. 
Nonetheless, we will address it in light of the plaintiffs' 
argument on appeal. The Beech-Nut memorandum 
regarding cereal prices confirms the plaintiffs' assertion 
that Beech-Nut has "taken a position [of] parity with 
Gerber." However, plaintiffs omitted the preceding phrase 
explaining that the position was taken "[F]or market 
reasons. . . ." Furthermore, the charts Dr. Madansky 
generated show that Nestle/Beech-Nut's list cereal prices 
were not at parity with Gerber's prices. The charts show 
that in February 1989, the same month as the date on the 
Beech-Nut document, Gerber's cereal prices jumped from 
slightly below Beech-Nut's prices to well above those prices, 
and that Beech-Nut's cereal prices did not rise again until 
seven months later, shortly before Nestle left the baby food 
business. The same Nestle/Beech-Nut document upon 
which plaintiffs rely repeatedly emphasizes that prices were 
being raised due to market factors, including increased 
costs in raw materials and packaging, and that the 
incremental price increase was less than the increase in 
costs. This document, therefore, reflects Beech-Nut's 
competitive behavior and not conscious parallelism. 
 
Contemporaneous documents also show that Heinz made 
independent pricing decisions in 1989. On February 14, 
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1989, Joe Fay, Heinz's product manager, sent Robert 
Roussey, Heinz's general business manager, a 
memorandum obtained from the trade, attaching a copy of 
Gerber's announced wholesale price advance effective 
February 13, 1989. Fay recommended that Heinz follow 
immediately on four of its food categories, but delay 
announcing any strained 4.2 oz juice price increase"till 
we've analyzed the strained retail pricing analysis study." 
On March 2, 1989, Fay recommended that Heinz 
implement a price increase effective May 4, 1989, to"match 
Gerber's and maintain our per ounce case differentials 
versus Gerber" on Junior, Meat, Cereal, and Juice. 
 
Conversely, Fay also recommended Heinz increase prices 
by only 11c or 2% on Beginner Foods, compared to 
Gerber's price increase of 40c on the same product 
segment due to Heinz's "inability to obtain our desired retail 
price differential using larger LTA [long term allowance] and 
smaller base cost differential." A revised Fay memorandum 
dated March 23, 1989, reflecting Heinz's decision to depart 
from Fay's original recommendation, was attached to the 
final product price change form. Furthermore, the memo 
revealed Heinz's decision not to match Gerber increases in 
Meats or Junior Foods, and "to expand our retail price 
differentials to levels (2-3c on Meats, 4c on Junior Foods) 
which will improve the volume of these historically 
declining businesses."11 Thus, these memoranda show in- 
depth, unilateral behavior, not collusive conformation. 
 
The defendants' personnel and expert testified that it was 
Heinz's general policy to maintain a "more or less constant 
differential" between Gerber's list prices and Heinz's list 
prices. Contrary to the plaintiffs' argument, the District 
Court did not ignore this testimony. Rather, the testimony 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
11. We observe that most of the documents introduced by the plaintiffs 
merely discuss "rumors" that the authors heard or "suspicions" that they 
had. As such, the documents can be discounted as non-probative for 
they show a lack of knowledge about the competitors' pricing and are 
inconsistent with a price-fixing scheme. For example, in the March 2, 
1990, Beech-Nut document to which the plaintiffs point, the author 
merely states that he "anticipates" a Gerber price increase in the first 
quarter of 1987. In another Beech-Nut document the author has had 
heard "very strong rumors" of a Gerber price increase. App. at 3893a. 
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shows a business judgmental policy to offer the public 
consumer a "value brand" at a price less costly than the 
price offered by the market leader, Gerber. This policy fails 
to prove parallel price behavior. 
 
Market realities also clearly controvert the plaintiffs' 
contention. On March 30, 1987, six months after Beech- 
Nut's price increase, Heinz increased the list price on cereal 
by an amount that was less than Gerber and Beech-Nut to 
maintain its traditional position "as the price value brand." 
The same fiscal year 1987 price increase memorandum 
recommendation to Roussey noted that "[i]n September 
FY87, Beech-Nut attempted to lead the industry with a 
price increase (+20È per case) but they were not followed by 
Gerber or Heinz at that time." In 1988, Heinz did not raise 
prices on Junior Foods, despite Gerber's price increase. 
Heinz chose this strategy because "[a]ny increase to these 
differentials due to a price increase will decrease Heinz's 
Junior Foods volume as a result of a weakening of its 
price/value positioning and possibly due to reduced 
distribution." 
 
Beech-Nut, who increased its list prices three months 
before Heinz's increase, did not increase list prices for 
Junior Foods. In 1990, Heinz did not match Gerber's price 
increase on Junior Foods "to widen the objective Heinz- 
Gerber retail price differential from 4c to 5c." Supp. App. at 
4892. In addition, Heinz did not match Gerber's price 
increase on Meats "in an effort to stabilize [its] Meats 
business." Id. However, in so doing, it "widen[ed] [its] retail 
price differential from 3c to 4c." Id. 
 
In 1991, Heinz's D. F. Ryan recommended fiscal year 
1991 baby food price increases to match Gerber's increase 
to "maintain our price differentials versus Gerber." The 
recommendation, however, excluded any price increase for 
Second or Third Food meats and suggested an increased 
price for cereal of 61c as against Gerber's increase of 80È 
so as to expand the unit differential between them from 
4.4c to 6.0. An August 1992 memo from Heinz employee 
Deborah Billow informed G. Price that "Bob and I have 
agreed to not follow Gerber's most recent price increase on 
Beginner Food until January 1, 1993 when it is currently 
budgeted." 
 
                                38 
  
Although we recognize that parallel pricing does not 
require "uniform prices," and permits prices within an 
agreed upon range, Socony-Vacuum, 310 U.S. at 222, the 
memoranda to Roussey and the subsequent memoranda of 
Ryan and Billow demonstrate that the defendants did not 
blindly raise their prices to follow Gerber, the price leader. 
The defendants' prices were neither uniform nor within any 
agreed upon price range of each other. These memoranda 
reveal that the defendants engaged in independent pricing 
determined by market conditions at the time, profit 
margins, and the effect of price increases or decreases on 
sales volume and distribution. They provide a striking 
insight into the defendants' marketing strategy which 
negates the plaintiffs' inference of conscious parallelism. 
 
Thus, we see no substance to plaintiffs' argument that 
the District Court ignored testimony and documents of the 
defendants' witnesses which would have confirmed the 
plaintiffs' case for conscious parallelism. On the contrary, 





The Plus Factors 
 
The plaintiffs strenuously argue on appeal that, in 
addition to direct and circumstantial evidence showing the 
defendants' joint action, they presented more than 
sufficient evidence of "plus factors" to defeat summary 
judgment. They claim that the record contains substantial 
evidence that all the defendants (1) had an econom ic 
motive to conspire in order to increase their profits, (2) had 
ample opportunity to conspire, and (3) acted again st their 
independent economic self-interests by exchanging price 
information, including information concerning future price 
increases. They assert that the District Court, in 
discovering no plus factors, simply ignored the evidence.12 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
12. Despite its earlier conclusion "that there is no permissible inference 
of parallel pricing," the District Court devoted approximately 20% of its 
34-page opinion to the discussion of the plus factors. The extensive 
discussion by the district court at least negates the plaintiffs' 
complaint 
that the district court ignored the evidence. 
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In Petruzzi, we stated that a conspiracy based on 
consciously parallel behavior requires a plaintiff not only to 
show parallel behavior and awareness in their decision 
making, but also certain plus factors. Id. at 1242; see also 
Shoenkopf v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 637 F.2d 
205, 208 (3d Cir. 1980). Moreover, the Supreme Court has 
stated that evidence of plus factors must tend to exclude 
the possibility of independent conduct. Monsanto, 465 U.S. 
at 764. 
 
We have undertaken a comprehensive review of the 
record and we do not agree with the plaintiffs that the 
District Court "ignored the evidence" in discovering no plus 
factors. On the contrary, the court determined that the 
evidence showed that each defendant independently was 
able to obtain information concerning its competitors' 
product pricing and promotions. The District Court 
concluded that the evidence did not permit it to reasonably 
infer a price-fixing conspiracy. D.C. Op. at 27. It stated that 
"[t]here [was] a paucity of written documentation evidencing 
any concerted exchange of pricing information." D.C. Op. at 
27. Moreover, the court determined that the record simply 
showed that the defendants were sophisticated corporations 
that sought and prized competitive information concerning 
the activities of their competitors. D.C. Op. at 28. 
 
In keeping with its consideration of the plus factors, the 
court discussed the evidence as to the defendants' advance 
price announcements. It noted that other courts have 
determined that advance price announcements " `served an 
important purpose in the industry.' " D.C. Op. at 29, 
(quoting Reserve Supply Corp. v. Owens-Corning Fiberglass 
Corp., 971 F.2d 37, 54 (7th Cir. 1992)). The court 
concluded the defendants' advance notices do not support 
proof of concerted action by them; many of the documents 
to which plaintiffs point speak only in terms of "a suspicion 
or rumor that one of the defendants would be raising prices 
or making changes to a particular product." D.C. Op. at 29. 
As examples, it pointed to a Beech-Nut budget document 
dated December 31, 1986, in which Beech-Nut President 
Theuer stated that he "anticipated a Gerber price increase." 
Id. (Emphasis added). The court also observed in another 
Beech-Nut document that the author stated that he 
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"strongly suspects" that Gerber would increase prices on 
March 2, 1990. Id. 
 
The court determined that the nature of the exchanges of 
information among the defendants' sales representatives 
amounted to mere "chit chat" at chance meetings or trade 
shows among persons with no pricing authority. Op. at 30. 
The court further noted that courts generally reject 
conspiracy claims that "seek to infer an agreement from . . . 
communications despite a lack of independent evidence 
tending to show an agreement and in the face of 
uncontradicted testimony that only informational 
exchanges took place." Op. at 31, (quoting Alvord-Polk, 37 
F.3d at 1014). The trial judge's perceptive observation is 
correct. 
 
The District Court also dealt with the evidence of 
opportunity to conspire emphasized by the plaintiffs. In 
Petruzzi, this court, in considering plus factors, did not 
attach much weight to evidence of opportunity. We noted 
that evidence of social contacts and telephone calls among 
representatives of the defendants was insufficient to 
exclude the possibility that the defendants acted 
independently. 998 F.2d at 1242 n.15. The trial court also 
concluded that "[s]uch evidence of `opportunity' should be 
accorded little, if any weight. Company personnel do not 
often operate in a vacuum or `plastic bubble'; they 
sometimes engage in the longstanding tradition of social 
discourse." Op. at 32. 
 
The court concluded that there were a number of reasons 
to reject plaintiffs' argument with respect to motive to 
conspire. The court reasoned that if there were a 
conspiracy, Gerber, the market leader, would not lower its 
prices from time to time while at or about the same time, 
Beech-Nut or Heinz, or both, raised their prices. 
Furthermore, if, as the plaintiffs contend, the defendants 
had a motive to achieve higher prices, "then every company 
in every industry would have such a `motive.' " (D.C. op. at 
32). Accordingly, it concluded that Heinz and Beech-Nut 
had no motive to enter into a price-fixing conspiracy with 
Gerber. 
 
In further consideration of the plus factors, the court also 
turned to the Coble testimony concerning the alleged truce 
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and the testimony of other employees. The court found that 
the testimony failed to support the plaintiffs' argument as 
to plus factors. This evidence, the court found, showed only 
Heinz's fear that penetrating territory dominated by a 
competitor "might erupt in another conflagration in the 
industry." (D.C. op. at 33). 
 
We agree with the District Court that the plaintiffs' 
evidence of alleged plus factors do not prove concerted, 
collusive behavior, although our reasoning may differ. We 
also have examined the testimony of plaintiffs' expert, Dr. 
Sam Peltzman, on whom the plaintiffs largely depend for 
proof of motive and conduct contrary to self-interest. Dr. 
Peltzman supplied the plaintiffs with two affidavits, the 
latest and more substantive of which was dated January 
1997. 
 
In summary, his affidavits opine that there is a perfectly 
plausible motive for a firm like Heinz or Beech-Nut to 
engage in a conspiracy even if it "locks" itself into a 15% 
market because their profits from the conspiracy would be 
greater than from acting independently. (Peltzman Aff. I at 
P3) He rejects the claim that Heinz or Beech-Nut could have 
obtained the full benefit of a conspiracy by merely following 
Gerber's price increases as inconsistent with economic 
theory because, absent a conspiracy, Gerber would have set 
a lower price. Further, he stated that if Heinz or Beech-Nut 
determined their prices independently, their respective 
prices would have been lower, and their sales of baby food 
would have been higher, than under a price-fixing 
agreement. (Peltzman Aff. I at P4) Finally, he avers that 
economic theory suggests that Nestle and Ralston would do 
better with conspiratorial prices than without them so that, 
absent the conspiracy, their losses on the Beech-Nut 
business would have been greater still. (Peltzman Aff. I at 
P5) 
 
Without examining the validity of Dr. Peltzman's 
economic speculations, serious consideration may not be 
attributed to them because his opinion was based on the 
express assumption that the defendants had agreed to 
conspire. His assumptions and conclusions rest on the 
basic premise that there is an ongoing conspiracy. In his 
deposition of February 1996, he acknowledged that his 
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opinion assumed there was a conspiracy beginning January 
1, 1984 and lasting until December 31, 1993. For example, 
he rationalizes: 
 
       If Heinz or Beech-Nut determined their sales 
       independently, free of any restraint imposed by a 
       conspiratorial agreement, the total sales of baby food 
       would be higher and prices lower than would be 
       obtained under an agreement. It is precisely this 
       specter of lower prices and profit margins from 
       independent behavior which provides the incentive for 
       the parties to enter into and maintain a price-fixing 
       agreement. 
 
Moreover, he knew nothing about the baby food industry 
other than "the knowledge one acquires as a casual 
consumer." 
 
When Dr. Peltzman was subsequently deposed, he 
acknowledged that he had not undertaken any independent 
study of the baby food business in connection with his 
assignment in this case. He further conceded that he had 
no analysis of pricing by these defendants, except to review 
the average transaction prices reported in Table 1, as 
revised, by Dr. Madansky. He further acknowledged that he 
had not undertaken any review or study of the particular 
buyers of baby foods from the defendants in this case. 
Neither had he made any analysis of promotional programs 
nor looked at whether the baby food industry fits the model 
of manufacturers following in their pricing practices the 
price leader. 
 
With such limited information before him, Peltzman 
opined that each of the defendants had a motive to engage 
in a conspiracy, even if they "locked" themselves into a 15% 
market share because "their profits from the conspiracy 
would be greater than from acting independently," and that 
any benefit that Heinz and Beech-Nut could have obtained 
by simply following Gerber's list price increases is 
inconsistent with basic economic theory. Peltzman's opinion 
is nothing more than an abstract statement based on 
"economic theory" that the interest in enhancing profits 
motivated the defendants to conspire. He never made any 
reference to the evidence in this case; he never analyzed the 
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pricing conduct of any of the defendants. In a free 
capitalistic society, profit is always a motivating factor in 
the conduct of a business. Profit is a legitimate motive in 
pricing decisions, and something more is required before a 
court can conclude that competitors conspired tofix pricing 
in violation of the Sherman Act. Here, there is nothing more 
or unusual other than the alleged instances of trade wars 
between the defendants. Thus, if a firm's motivation is 
merely to meet rival prices, it would constitute only 
interdependence. Accordingly, to prove conspiracy, evidence 
of action that is against self-interest or motivated by profit 
must go beyond mere interdependence. Parallel pricefixing 
must be so unusual that in the absence of an advance 
agreement, no reasonable firm would have engaged in it. 
Coleman v. Cannon Oil Co., 849 Supp. 1458, 1467 (M.D. 
Ala. 1993). 
 
With respect to the defendants' alleged conduct contrary 
to self-interest, Peltzman also assumes that as 
conspirators, the defendants "exchanged with each other 
information about price changes and changes in marketing 
plans, such as increased couponing and changed 
promotional allowances prior to the announcement to the 
trade." No evidence in this record, however, shows that any 
executive of any defendant exchanged price or market 
information with any other executive. As we have already 
noted, any information obtained about a competitor was 
information plucked from the trade in the marketplace, 
"chit-chat" of field representatives, and their informal and 
casual conversations at trade shows or while stocking 
shelves. This desultory collection of information"on the 
street" by sales representatives is far removed from a 
concerted reciprocal exchange of important pricing and 
marketing information by the officers of major companies, 
particularly an exchange pursuant to an agreement. 
 
Even assuming the admissibility of Dr. Peltzman's 
opinion, we conclude that his testimony and report offers 
little substance, if any, to advance the defendants' 
argument that the defendants acted contrary to their self- 
interest. An expert opinion based on the meager superficial 
information on which Peltzman relied is highly speculative, 
unreliable, and of dubious admissibility before a jury. 
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"When an expert opinion is not supported by sufficient 
facts to validate it in the eyes of the law, or when 
indisputable record facts contradict or otherwise render the 
opinion unreasonable, it cannot support a jury's verdict." 
Brooke Group, 509 U.S. at 242. See also Advo v. 
Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc., 51 F.3d 1191, 1199 (3d Cir. 
1995). We, therefore, conclude Dr. Peltzman's opinion offers 
meager evidence of defendants' behavior contrary to self- 
interest and of motivation to conspire. 
 
We need not dwell on plaintiffs' contention that evidence 
of the "alleged" truce and the unwillingness of Heinz to 
enter the Chicago or Florida areas as conduct against its 
own self-interest. We previously discussed this argument 
and our rationale then is sufficient reason to reject this 
evidence as a plus factor. Plaintiffs cite to Milgrim v. Loews, 
192 F.2d 579 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 343 U.S. 929 (1952), 
in support of their argument that Heinz's rejection of 
advantageous offers constitutes a plus factor. Milgrim 
involved the distribution of films in the movie industry in 
which eight distributors were charged under the Sherman 
Act for refusing to distribute first run films to plaintiff's 
drive-in theaters. All eight distributors acted in"complete 
unanimity" in refusing to license features onfirst-run films 
to plaintiff even when offered a higher rental. All acted in 
substantial unanimity in refusing to make sure that feature 
films were available to plaintiff until after a 28-day run in 
conventional theaters. Id. at 583. The court therefore 
concluded that "each distributor has thus acted in 
apparent contradiction to its own self interest . . . for the 
conduct of the distributors is, in the absence of a valid 
explanation, inconsistent with decisions independently 
arrived at." Id. 
 
Milgrim is inapposite. Instead of joint and conspiratorial 
activity to fix prices and eviscerate competition as the 
plaintiffs in this case claim, our review of the record 
convinces us that the evidence overwhelmingly establishes 
that the defendants in their marketing activities acted 
independently rather than in "complete unanimity," 
competitively rather than conspiratorially, and aggressively 
rather than supinely. 
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Some illustrations follow. In an intra-corporate 
memorandum dated December 15, 1989, from Heinz's 
Gorsky to all division and assistant division managers, he 
explained that the reason for a price increase was "[r]ising 
costs for raw ingredients, packaging materials, and fringe 
benefits." Heinz continued to emphasize a "two brand 
strategy" to oust Beech-Nut from markets and accounts, 
and Beech-Nut countered with aggressive competitive 
activity against Heinz. Heinz's Five Year Business Plan, 
dated October 1989, constituted a ninety million dollar 
program approved by the Heinz board of directors to 
renovate its Pittsburgh factory and lower its operating costs 
"in the face of intense competitive activity from Beech-Nut 
and Gerber." This demonstrates aggressive competitor 
activity, not collusive, price fixing behavior. 
 
Continuing, a Sales Division Activity Report for January 
1989, reflects Heinz's loss of several important accounts to 
substantial competitive offers by Beech-Nut. A Heinz Baby 
Food Presentation for Dallas, Texas, refers to 
implementation of a "Texas Defense Program" in 1988 
undertaken specifically to protect against Beech-Nut's 
major push to enter Texas's principal markets. A November 
1988 Heinz report noted that "Beech-Nut continues to be 
aggressive and as a result has forced us to spend heavily to 
defend our distribution base." A September 27, 1988 Heinz 
Activity Report noted that Beech-Nut was aggressively 
pursuing Heinz's accounts in a number of markets and that 
Heinz's defensive measures had been generally effective. A 
November 1988 Heinz report noted that "Beech-Nut 
continues to be aggressive and as a result has forced us to 
spend heavily to defend our distribution base." A May 1992 
Heinz report describing a Detroit business program 
initiated in May 1990 after Beech-Nut "assaulted the 
Detroit district" noted a fiscal year 1991 increase of 74% in 
discounts and allowances. This too demonstrates 
independent, aggressive action, not collaborative, concerted 
conduct. 
 
Various business documents also reflect Heinz's desire to 
gradually reduce "deal spending," i.e., promotions and 
allowances as early as September 1984. This was met by 
continued, competitive pressures as reflected by Heinz's 
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Business Plan FY86 referring to "Beech-Nut's continuing 
roll-out of Stages as a full line replacement for Heinz Wet." 
The Plan shows that by the end of 1985, Heinz was worried 
about the "fiercely competitive environment," viewing 
Beech-Nut as "a formidable competitor" whose"aggressive 
new distribution efforts have again increased the cost of 
doing business for Heinz Wet." Furthermore, the Plan 
concluded that "[i]ncreased competitive trade spending will 
continue to make it difficult for the Product Group and 
Sales to implement riskier trade spending reductions." 
 
As for Beech-Nut, in a document dated October 30, 1984, 
Hoyvald wrote to Biggar regarding the 1984 fiscal budget. 
He stated that the problem confronting Beech-Nut was 
"rising costs and no general offset in selling price 
increases." As a consequence of the rising costs, Hoyvald 
stated that "we are forced to include a planned price 
increase in STAGES products April 1st." Id. At the same 
time, he observed that the baby food industry had not 
made a general price increase since May 1982. Finally, he 
noted that their budget allowed no new investments, but 
they planned "to work on and have ready an alternate 
aggressive expansion plan to be submitted at a time when 
a solid success story is projectable." 
 
In a weekly position letter for the week ending September 
13, 1986, a Beech-Nut employee recommended, based on 
Gerber's decision to reformulate the size of their first foods 
products, that Beech-Nut repackage its Stages One 
products "to maintain our exclusivity in small wholesaler 
and independent sources." In a January 16, 1990 Status 
Report, Beech-Nut's Humbarger stated that "once the sale 
of Beech-Nut Nutrition was announced July 5th, the 
competition in the category began to heat up. Both Gerber 
and Heinz were trying to take advantage of the situation." 
In a May 10, 1990 Status Report, he noted that "Gerber 
continues to call on our exclusive stores with money offers 
and free goods. Gerber has presented a program to King 
Kullen for consideration." This report and the earlier 
communications unequivocally refute any price-fixing 
agreement on the part of Beech-Nut with any of the other 
defendants. 
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With the exception of a $7,000 pre-tax profit in 1980, the 
first year Nestle's ownership of Beech-Nut, Nestle made no 
profit on its baby food business in any of the ten years 
during which it owned Beech-Nut. For instance, shortly 
before Nestle sold Beech-Nut to Ralston, Beech-Nut Baby 
Food Presentation documents illustrate that the 
Nestle/Beech-Nut's company-wide average selling price per 
case of baby food was $7.51 and the average cost per case 
was $8.23. Thus, at that time, Nestle lost an average of 72È 
per case for every case it sold. It is inconceivable that with 
losses running at least 10% for every case sold, Nestle 
would have remained a party to a conspiracy to fix prices, 
preserve Gerber's market share year after year, and run up 
its own losses. 
 
As to Ralston, the plaintiffs offer no references to any 
Ralston business plans, internal documents, testimony, or 
any other evidence of record that even suggests that 
Ralston acted with the intention of preserving Gerber's 
market share. No evidence was presented establishing that 
Ralston ever had knowledge of price increases by either 
Gerber or Heinz before Gerber or Heinz announced those 
increases to their customers. No evidence was presented 
showing that either Gerber or Heinz had prior knowledge of 
price increases by Ralston prior to Ralston's 
announcements to the trade. No evidence was presented to 
support any claim that Ralston entered into a "truce" with 
Gerber or Heinz. Only expert Dr. Peltzman made reference 
to Ralston, and we perceive no probative value in his 
testimony. 
 
With the foregoing evidence of strong, intensive 
competition and hardly a scintilla of evidence of concerted, 
collusive conduct, we can see no error in the District 
Court's conclusion that there was insufficient evidence to 
satisfy the "plus factor" requirement. The plaintiffs' 
argument that the record shows "that all defendants had 
an economic motive to conspire in order to increase their 
profit margins" rests solely on the unsupported opinion of 
Dr. Peltzman. In a free capitalistic society, all entrepreneurs 
have a legitimate understandable motive to increase profits. 
Profit is the essence of a capitalistic economy. Dr. 
Peltzman's bare opinion of an obvious fact cannot avoid 
 
                                48 
  
summary judgment. We can discover nothing in this record 
to show that any of the defendants acted unlawfully. The 







Price-fixing, we have been instructed by the Supreme 
Court, "includes more than the mere establishment of 
uniform prices." Socony-Vacuum, 310 U.S. at 222. The 
circumstantial evidence addressed by plaintiffs, though 
voluminous, lacks the essential substance to find a 
conspiracy. There is no evidence of record showing 
reciprocal exchange of information by any executive of the 
defendants with price-fixing authority. Despite exhaustive 
and prolonged discovery, no evidence has been produced 
showing that, during the alleged 17-year conspiratorial 
period, any executive of any of the defendants with price- 
fixing authority communicated with executives of the other 
defendants, either by writing, telephone or meeting. 
Whatever information sales representatives culled from the 
trade or from each other amounted to no more than an 
accumulation of sporadic market snippets, not an 
organized, concerted exchange of information among 
company executives or their authorized agents. 
 
The evidence of conscious parallelism to prove tacit 
collusion falls far short of being probative proof of concerted 
action. The market here is nationwide for the two largest 
defendants and considerably smaller for Nestle/Ralston; 
their varied products are in the hundreds. Allowances and 
discounts to specific customers and in specific areas are 
pervasive, even varying at times between the same 
customer and with the quantities purchased and the areas 
served. There is no evidence that in such a diffuse and 
frenetic discount market there was any mechanism in place 
to detect conspirator cheating. Without such a mechanism, 
no conspiracy, if it existed, could long endure. 
 
Because Gerber, Heinz and either Nestle or Ralston 
collectively controlled 98% of the baby food industry 
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nationwide, and during a prolonged period of time when 
wholesale food prices generally were escalating, they were 
an especially inviting target to attack under the Sherman 
Act for price-fixing. However, there is positive and 
unequivocal evidence that the defendants engaged in 
unilateral, aggressive competition limited only by budgetary 
considerations, cash, and market conditions. 
 
We are cognizant that the baby food industry is highly 
concentrated with only three companies controlling the 
nationwide manufacture and distribution of their baby food 
products. We realize that such a scenario could facilitate 
explicit or tacit price-fixing. We also are aware that during 
the period spanned by the alleged conspiracy, wholesale 
food prices in the nation generally escalated; this upward 
movement could provide cover for non-competitive pricing 
practices. Furthermore, the baby food industry carries the 
crucial responsibility for providing much of the nutrition for 
almost all of the infants nationwide, an obligation that 
emphasizes the necessity for total compliance under the 
Sherman Act. As a court, however, we have the duty to 
examine the record carefully and decide the case fairly on 
the law and not on mere conjecture, ambiguous 
circumstantial evidence, and suspicion. The plaintiffs have 
not produced any evidence of an explicit agreement to fix 
prices and preserve market share. Drawing all inferences in 
their favor, they have failed to produce sufficient 
circumstantial evidence to prove concerted collusion that 
tends to exclude the possibility of independent action. See 
Monsanto, 465 U.S. at 768. 
 




Taxation of Costs 
 
Following the District Court's grant of summary 
judgment, three of the defendants moved the Clerk of the 
District Court to tax costs for, inter alia, deposition 
transcripts used by the court in reaching its decision. The 
Clerk, relying on 28 U.S.C. S 1920(2), awarded costs to the 
defendants in the following amounts: Gerber: $24,299.52, 
 
                                50 
  
Heinz: $18,833.01, Nestle: $1,507.10, and Ralston: 
$12,221.00. On appeal to the District Court, it affirmed the 
Clerk's award. See Order of January 27, 1998.13 
 
The plaintiffs take no issue with the amount of the costs. 
Their contention is that the District Court erred by ignoring 
the clear mandate of L.Civ.R.54.1(g)(7),14  as well as the 
principal commentary accompanying that section. The 
commentary provides that "L.Civ.R.54.1(g)(7) allows for the 
taxation of deposition costs directly related to the use of the 
deposition transcript at trial. The key to taxability under 
this provision is that the transcript be `used at trial' 
pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P.32.' " Lite, N.J. Federal Practice 
Rules, Comment 4.e to Rule 54.1(Gann 1998 ed.) at 106. 
 
The plaintiffs argue that the Clerk lacked the authority to 
award tax costs because this case never reached the trial 
stage. Alternatively, the plaintiffs contend that the District 
Court erred because it was "bound by the local rules of the 
district where [it] reside[s]." Pl. Br. at 53. Accordingly, the 
court was obligated to apply L.Civ.R.54.1(g)(7). Finally, they 
assert that this court should review the District Court's 
decision de novo, because the latter made a legal 
interpretation of a rule of procedure. 
 
The plaintiffs' contentions fail. First, a District Court's 
grant of costs is reviewed for abuse of discretion. Tilton v. 
Capital Cities/ABC, Inc., 115 F.3d 1471, 1474 (10th Cir. 
1997) See also, Morgan v. Perry, 142 F.3d 670,682 (3d Cir. 
1998). Second, section 1920 has been interpreted as 
permitting the taxation of costs for depositions used in 
deciding summary judgment motions. See, e.g., Id. This 
makes common sense, for to hold otherwise would penalize 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
13. 28 U.S.C. S 1920(2) provides that a federal court may tax costs "for 
all or any part of the stenographic transcript necessarily obtained for 
use 
in the case." 
 
14. New Jersey Local Rule 54.1(g)(7) provides, in pertinent part: 
 
        In taxing costs, the Clerk shall allow all or part of the fees and 
       charges incurred in the taking and transcribing of depositions used 
       at the trial under Rule 32 of the Civil Rules. Fees and charges for 
       the taking and transcribing of any other deposition shall not be 
       taxed as costs unless the Court otherwise orders. . . .[emphasis 
       added.] 
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the prevailing party for winning in the early stages of the 
proceeding. Third, L.Civ.R.54.1(g)(7) provides a 
discretionary mechanism. More particularly, it provides 
"fees and charges for the taking and transcribing of any 
other deposition shall not be taxed as costs unless the 
Court otherwise orders." Id. The "otherwise orders" provision 
was explicitly utilized by the District Court in this case. The 
court explained that "it is clear from the Rule that this 
Court has the authority to award costs for any other 
depositions." D.C. Op. at 4. 
 
We hold that the District Court was well within its 
discretion to order the plaintiffs to pay costs. Fed. R. Civ. 
P. 32 suggests that the "used at trial" language in the local 
rule should be interpreted in accordance with Rule 32, 
which takes a broader approach to deposition use than the 
literal use "at trial." Furthermore, to the extent that it 
conflicts with S 1920, L.Civ.R.54.1(g)(7) must give way. See 
Fed. R. Civ. P. 83. The order of the District Court taxing 
costs will be affirmed. 
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